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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the 
Supreme Court held that the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines could not constitutionally be applied as diktats.  
Rather than scrap the Guidelines entirely, the Court left them 
intact as advisory and trial judges may vary from them, within 
reason, after applying the relevant provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).  Before doing so, it is important that trial judges 
accurately calculate the Guidelines range and correctly rule 
on departure motions.  Failure to accomplish either of these 
tasks typically will cause us to vacate and remand for 
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resentencing.  In some cases, however, the procedural error 
committed by the sentencing court is so insignificant or 
immaterial that prudence dictates that we hold such error 
harmless.  Because we view this appeal as one of those cases, 
we will affirm Appellant Mark Zabielski‘s judgment of 
sentence. 
I 
 On December 9, 2009, Zabielski robbed his hometown 
PNC Bank in West Newton, Pennsylvania.  In an effort to 
disguise his appearance, he wore clothes that belonged to his 
stepfather and altered his visage.  Footage from PNC‘s 
security tapes demonstrates that Zabielski entered the bank 
calmly and did ―not appear to be confused, disoriented, or 
otherwise mentally adrift.‖  App. 140–41. 
 Zabielski approached the teller and handed her a note 
that read: ―$10,000.‖  The teller, confused by the note, asked 
Zabielski if he wanted to withdraw the funds from his 
checking or savings account.  He replied: ―You don‘t 
understand.  I need the money now.  You have two minutes.‖  
PSR ¶ 4; App. 142. 
 Looking down, the teller noticed a bulge in Zabielski‘s 
jacket pocket, which gave her the impression that Zabielski 
might have been carrying a gun or a knife.  The teller took 
$4,767 in cash from her drawer, along with some bait money, 
but she decided not to give the bait money to Zabielski for 
fear of what he might do if he discovered it. 
 Zabielski later told several people about the robbery, 
including his mother, who convinced him to return the 
money.  He mailed $3,790 to the bank from a separate town, 
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in a package addressed both to and from the bank he robbed, 
after first cleaning the money with alcohol. 
 Images from the bank security cameras were provided 
to the local media, and Zabielski was quickly identified as the 
culprit.  When authorities interviewed Zabielski on December 
11, 2009, he denied having committed the robbery and lied 
about where he had been at the time of the crime.  A grand 
jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania indicted 
Zabielski on one count of bank robbery in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2113(a) on March 16, 2010, and he pleaded guilty a 
year later. 
 The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared 
by the United States Probation Office assigned Zabielski a 
total offense level of 21, which included a two-level 
enhancement for making a threat of death during the 
commission of the robbery pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of 
the Guidelines.  With an offense level of 21 and a criminal 
history category of I, Zabielski‘s advisory Guidelines range 
was 37 to 46 months‘ imprisonment.  Zabielski objected to 
the two-level enhancement, arguing that he had not made a 
threat of death.  According to Zabielski, his correct offense 
level was 19, which would have yielded an advisory 
Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months‘ imprisonment.  The 
District Court determined that the threat of death 
enhancement was appropriate in the circumstances of the 
case. 
 Zabielski also requested a downward variance.  He 
argued that he suffered from bipolar disorder and had 
resumed treatment since the robbery, but claimed he would 
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not  receive effective treatment in prison.
1
  During the 
sentencing hearing, Zabielski provided the District Court with 
a psychological evaluation and letters from friends and family 
describing his mental illness, his behavior when he was not 
taking medication, and the improvement in his behavior when 
he was managing his illness correctly.  Zabielski also 
introduced a statement regarding bipolar disorder from the 
National Institute of Mental Health and testimony suggesting 
that, based on the many individuals with mental illness at 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities and the BOP‘s 
limited mental health resources, he might not receive the 
treatment he needed in prison. 
 The Government argued that Zabielski should receive 
a within-Guidelines sentence of 37 to 46 months‘ 
imprisonment.  It disputed Zabielski‘s claim that he would 
not be able to receive proper treatment in prison.  It also 
presented evidence demonstrating that Zabielski had 
previously engaged in criminal conduct.  FBI Agent Michael 
Nealon testified that he interviewed one of Zabielski‘s ex-
girlfriends during the investigation, and that she claimed 
Zabielski had tried to kick her down the stairs.  Another ex-
girlfriend also had filed assault charges against Zabielski, but 
those charges were nol prossed upon Zabielski‘s completion 
of a domestic abuse counseling program.  Agent Nealon 
learned from a third ex-girlfriend that Zabielski had likely 
broken into a house and stolen items, a claim that was 
supported by pawn shop tickets for the stolen items bearing 
                                                 
1
 Zabielski moved for downward departures based on 
similar grounds.  He does not challenge on appeal the District 
Court‘s denial of those motions, except to request 
reconsideration in the event of remand. 
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Zabielski‘s name and driver‘s license number.  One of 
Zabielski‘s ex-girlfriends also told Agent Nealon that 
Zabielski had pawned his stepfather‘s firearms.  Pawn shop 
tickets supported this claim, as well. 
 After hearing arguments from both sides, the District 
Court conducted a thorough examination of the 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) factors.  It considered Zabielski‘s prior criminal 
conduct, his lack of respect for his community, the serious 
nature of his crime, the need to deter Zabielski and others 
from future criminal conduct, and the need to protect the 
public from further crimes that he might commit.  The 
District Court acknowledged that Zabielski had a history of 
mental illness, but found that it did not justify a downward 
variance.  The sentencing judge also expressed concern that 
Zabielski was unable to ―keep [himself] sober and on [his] 
medications.‖  App. 306.  She remarked: ―You say that you 
quit drugs, and I applaud you for that, but I think that the 
drugs in the past may have had some impact on your current 
diagnosis.‖  App. 309–10. 
 The District Court also explained that, contrary to 
Zabielski‘s suggestion, he would receive adequate treatment 
in a BOP facility: 
[T]he BOP, in my estimation, can treat your 
bipolar disorder.  They can treat your diabetes.  
They do have the medications available to 
you. . . . You have a history of depression, 
anxiety, and panic disorders as well.  I think 
those can be addressed at the BOP.  And in my 
estimation, the BOP generally goes beyond 
community standards for mental health.  So, I 
think whatever you‘re going to get in a facility 
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is better than you could get in West Newton, 
especially if you‘re not working full-time, and if 
you don‘t have [an insurance] card, and you 
don‘t have the money, because you‘re not 
working to pay for the medications. 
App. 309–10. 
 Consistent with its review of the § 3553(a) factors, the 
District Court denied Zabielski‘s request for a downward 
variance.  After hearing Zabielski‘s allocution, however, the 
District Court changed course.  Finding that Zabielski was 
sincerely remorseful, the District Court sentenced him to 24 
months‘ incarceration, a downward variance of thirteen 
months below the bottom of his Guidelines range and six 
months below the bottom of the range he requested.  In spite 
of this lenient sentence,  Zabielski appealed. 
II
2
 
 Although Zabielski raises a congeries of arguments, 
the crux of his appeal is that the District Court committed 
procedural error when it applied a two-level threat of death 
enhancement.  Because we hold that any error by the District 
Court was harmless, we will affirm Zabielski‘s judgment of 
sentence. 
                                                 
2
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  Because Zabielski appeals a final judgment of 
conviction and sentence, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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A 
 In reviewing the District Court‘s sentence, we first 
consider whether the Court committed a significant 
procedural error, such as improperly calculating the 
Guidelines range.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court‘s interpretation and application of the 
Guidelines, United States v. Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874, 875–76 
(3d Cir. 1997), we review determinations of fact for clear 
error, United States v. Thomas, 327 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 
2003), and we ―give due deference to the district court‘s 
application of the guidelines to the facts,‖ id. (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e)).  Even if we determine that the District 
Court committed procedural error, however, we may still 
uphold its sentence if the error was harmless.  See United 
States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 162 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 141 (2009) (noting 
that procedural errors at sentencing are ―routinely subject to 
harmlessness review‖). 
Although all bank robberies involve some threat of 
harm, see Thomas, 327 F.3d at 257, § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of the 
Guidelines requires a two-level increase in offense level when 
the defendant‘s conduct and statements were so threatening 
that they amounted to a threat of death.  This enhancement 
applies when the defendant has ―engaged in conduct that 
would instill in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the 
offense, a fear of death.‖  Thomas, 327 F.3d at 255 (quoting 
USSG § 2B3.1 app. n.6). 
 Before the Supreme Court decided Booker, we had 
occasion to review district court applications of the ―threat of 
death‖ enhancement.  See, e.g., Thomas, 327 F.3d at 254; 
 9 
 
United States v. Day, 272 F.3d 216, 217 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Figueroa, 105 F.3d at 875.  Each time we affirmed the district 
court‘s decision to impose the enhancement.  In most of the 
cases, the defendant had explicitly threatened death or clearly 
stated that he possessed a weapon, see, e.g., Day, 272 F.3d at 
217; Figueroa, 105 F.3d at 876–77, 880, but we also deferred 
to the district court‘s determination in more ambiguous 
circumstances.  For example, in Thomas, the defendant 
handed the teller a note stating: ―Do exactly what this says, 
fill the bag with $100s, $50s and $20s, a dye pack will bring 
me back for your ass, do it quick now.‖  327 F.3d at 254.  We 
noted that whether the defendant‘s conduct actually amounted 
to a threat of death was ―not free from doubt,‖ but determined 
that the district court‘s application of the threat of death 
enhancement was not clear error.  Id. at 257. 
 Zabielski‘s conduct less clearly amounts to a threat of 
death than any of the conduct we have previously 
considered—even in Thomas, where we expressed some 
uncertainty as to whether the enhancement was appropriate.  
Zabielski neither stated that he had a weapon nor explicitly 
threatened death; indeed, he did not explicitly threaten 
anything at all.  He made a statement to the teller that could 
be taken as an implicit threat—―you have two minutes‖—and 
he had a bulge in his pocket. 
 Now that the Guidelines are advisory, however, the 
District Court‘s imposition of the threat of death enhancement 
does not carry nearly the same significance it did before the 
Supreme Court decided Booker.  In this appeal, Zabielski 
concedes that his initial Guidelines range was accurately 
calculated, and there is no real suggestion that the District 
Court misapprehended any of the relevant facts surrounding 
the threat.  Zabielski challenges only the two-level increase, 
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which was dependent upon the District Court‘s understanding 
of, and appreciation for, the manner in which the bank 
robbery was committed.  We must decide whether the two-
level increase influenced the sentence imposed. 
 ―[A] non-constitutional error is harmless when ‗it is 
highly probable that the error did not prejudice‘ the 
defendant.‖  United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 
278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)).  In the context of a Guidelines 
calculation error, this means that the record must demonstrate 
that there is a high probability ―that the sentencing judge 
would have imposed the same sentence under a correct 
Guidelines range, that is, that the sentencing Guidelines range 
did not affect the sentence actually imposed.‖  Id. at 216.  
Because ―district courts must begin their analysis with the 
Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the 
sentencing process,‖ Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 
n.6 (2007), it usually will be difficult for an appellate court to 
conclude with sufficient confidence that the same sentence 
would have been imposed absent a clear statement to that 
effect by the sentencing judge.  See Langford, 516 F.3d at 
212.  An assumption that a district court would have imposed 
the same sentence regardless of the error would normally 
―place[] us in the zone of speculation and conjecture.‖  Id. at 
218 (quoting United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1170 
(10th Cir. 2007)). 
 In the typical case, an erroneous calculation of the 
defendant‘s base offense level or criminal history will not be 
harmless, particularly when the sentence imposed suggests 
that the district court chose to adhere to the advisory 
Guidelines range.  In United States v. Langford, for example, 
the district court mistakenly assigned the defendant a criminal 
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history category of IV instead of III.  Id. at 211.  The district 
court sentenced Langford to 46 months‘ imprisonment, a 
sentence that fell within both the erroneously calculated 
Guidelines range (46 to 57 months) and the correct 
Guidelines range (37 to 46 months).  Id. at 208, 210–11, 216–
19.  In holding that the error was not harmless, we noted that 
―where a court miscalculates a defendant‘s criminal history, 
its attempts to avoid disparity between defendants pursuant to 
§ 3553(a)(6) will be misguided as it ineluctably will compare 
the defendant to others who have committed the same offense 
but are in a different criminal history category.‖  Id. at 212–
13.  Furthermore, because the district court imposed a 
bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence, it was reasonable to 
assume that, absent the error, the sentencing judge might have 
imposed a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence pursuant to the 
lower, correct range.  See id. at 216 & n.3, 219.  Thus, 
whether the erroneous Guidelines range affected Langford‘s 
sentence was unclear, and the court made no explicit 
clarifying statements.  See id. at 218; see also United States v. 
Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 211, 215–16 (3d Cir. 2008).  As a 
result, we were unable to conclude that there was a high 
probability that the district court would have imposed the 
same sentence under both the erroneous and the applicable 
Guidelines ranges. 
 At the same time, we recognized that, ―[i]n the rare 
case,‖ it may be possible to discern from the record that the 
sentencing Guidelines range did not affect the actual 
sentence.  See Langford, 516 F.3d at 218 (citing Flores, 454 
F.3d at 162).  The erroneous application of an enhancement—
when it is clear from the record that the district court correctly 
apprehended both the facts underlying that enhancement and 
the significance of those facts—is more likely to be harmless 
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than the erroneous calculation of a defendant‘s initial 
Guidelines range.  This is because the purpose of an 
enhancement is to train the district court‘s attention on the 
details of the crime.  The threat of death enhancement at issue 
in this appeal, for example, required the court to consider the 
myriad types of threats that may occur in a robbery, and 
determine the appropriate level of punishment given the 
severity of the threat used by the defendant.  Since Booker, 
what is most important is that the sentencing judge 
understands the facts of the case, grasps their significance, 
and incorporates them into a just sentence.  To put it more 
colloquially, the mechanical application of ―plus two points‖ 
or ―minus two points‖ is far less significant now that the 
Guidelines are advisory. 
 In addition, an error is more likely to be harmless 
when it is clear from the record that the district court decided 
to vary from the advisory Guidelines range.  For example, in 
United States v. Flores, the district court calculated an 
advisory Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months‘ imprisonment, 
but sentenced the defendant to 32 months‘ imprisonment 
based on the § 3553(a) factors—―a term 38 months (and more 
than 50 percent) below the bottom of the Court‘s calculated 
advisory Guidelines range.‖  454 F.3d at 162.  On appeal, 
Flores argued that the court had made three errors in 
calculating his Guidelines range, including erroneously 
applying a two-level enhancement.  Id.  If the district court 
had made any one of the errors claimed by Flores, the 
sentence imposed still would have been below the applicable 
Guidelines range.  If the district court had made all three 
errors, the sentence would have been within the applicable 
advisory Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months‘ imprisonment.  
Id.  Given the district court‘s reliance on the § 3553(a) factors 
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and the substantial discrepancy between the sentence imposed 
and the calculated Guidelines range, we determined that there 
was a high probability that the district court would have 
imposed the same sentence regardless of the applicable 
advisory Guidelines range, and found that any error made in 
calculating the Guidelines range was harmless.
3
  Id. 
 Here, the District Court‘s detailed findings of fact and 
explanation convince us there is a high probability that it 
would have imposed the same sentence irrespective of the 
threat of death enhancement.  The District Court 
                                                 
 
3
 Other courts of appeals have determined that a 
Guidelines error can be harmless even when the district court 
did not explicitly state that it would have imposed the same 
sentence under either Guidelines range.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 121–22, 124 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (finding that any error in application of an 
enhancement would have been harmless when defendant 
received a sentence slightly below the calculated Guidelines 
range but above the purportedly applicable Guidelines range 
because it was clear from the record as a whole that the court 
focused on the § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Batista, 
684 F.3d 333, 339, 346–47 (2d Cir. 2012) (imposition of a 
four-level enhancement would have been harmless when 
court imposed a sentence that was significantly lower than the 
Guidelines range because of a downward departure for 
cooperation); see also United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 
220, 251 n.28 (2d Cir. 2012) (―[J]ust as a single unambiguous 
statement can permit us to identify a Guidelines error as 
harmless in some circumstances, we can draw the same 
conclusion from a careful review of the totality of a 
sentencing record.‖ (internal citation omitted)). 
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demonstrated its awareness of the details of the crime, 
including Zabielski‘s demeanor, his statements, and his 
physical appearance.  Although the District Court found the 
threat of death enhancement applicable, it fully appreciated 
the context surrounding Zabielski‘s conduct.  The Court then 
conducted a thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors.  After 
hearing and considering Zabielski‘s allocution, the District 
Court exercised its discretion to give Zabielski a substantial 
break, sentencing him to 24 months‘ incarceration, which was 
13 months below the calculated Guidelines range of 37 to 46 
months.  Even more poignant than Flores, here the sentence 
imposed also fell below the range that would have been 
applicable without the enhancement (30 to 37 months).  The 
record does not suggest in any way that the 24-month 
sentence was influenced by either the Guidelines range 
established by the District Court or the range Zabielski 
requested; instead, the District Court chose ―to disregard the 
Guidelines as too severe in such a way that we can be certain 
that the miscalculation had no effect on the sentence 
imposed.‖ Langford, 516 F.3d at 218.  Because the Court 
―clearly considered all the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in 
reaching its sentence and used its discretion in light of these 
factors, rather than in the application of a specific downward 
departure, to go below his advisory Guidelines range to 
identify the appropriate sentence,‖ Flores, 454 F.3d at 162, 
any error regarding the threat of death enhancement was 
harmless.
4
 
                                                 
4
 Contrary to Zabielski‘s contention in his Rule 28(j) 
letter, our recent decision in United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 
125 (3d Cir. 2013), does not affect this analysis.  In Castro, 
the defendant was convicted by a jury on one count of making 
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For the benefit of future cases, we emphasize that 
where, as here, the district court does not explicitly state that 
the enhancement had no effect on the sentence imposed, it 
usually will be difficult to ascertain that the error was 
harmless.  An explicit statement that the district court would 
have imposed the same sentence under two different ranges 
can help to improve the clarity of the record, promote 
efficient sentencing, and obviate questionable appeals such as 
this one.  As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has 
noted: 
[P]ointless reversals and unnecessary do-overs 
of sentence proceedings can be avoided if 
district courts faced with disputed guidelines 
issues state that the guidelines advice that 
results from decision of those issues does not 
matter to the sentence imposed after the 
§ 3553(a) factors are considered.  Likewise, if 
resolution of the guidelines issue does matter to 
the judge‘s ultimate sentencing decision, noting 
that it does will help focus our attention on the 
issues that matter. 
                                                                                                             
a material false statement to federal agents and pleaded guilty 
to conspiracy.  Id. at 129.  On appeal, we vacated his 
conviction for making a false statement.  Because this 
conviction had been used to increase the defendant‘s sentence 
for the conspiracy charge, we remanded the case so that the 
district court could reconsider the sentence.  Id. at 142–44.  
Remand was necessary because the original sentence was 
based, in part, on a crime of conviction that was later deemed 
invalid.  No such error occurred in Zabielski‘s case. 
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United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 773 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (Carnes, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  Though probative of harmless error, 
these statements will not always suffice to show that an error 
in calculating the Guidelines range is harmless; indeed, a 
district court still must explain its reasons for imposing the 
sentence under either Guidelines range.  See Smalley, 517 
F.3d at 214 (noting that if a departure or variance would be 
necessary to reach the actual sentence absent the Guidelines 
calculation error, the reasons for that departure or variance 
must be explained); United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 
154 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).  But if the applicability of an 
enhancement is uncertain, and the enhancement has no 
bearing on the sentence imposed by the district court, a 
thorough explanation of the district court‘s reasoning can help 
us identify when an erroneous Guidelines calculation had no 
effect on the final sentencing determination so we can avoid 
―setting aside a perfectly reasonable sentence and sending the 
case back for more proceedings which probably will result in 
the same sentence being imposed again.‖  Williams, 431 F.3d 
at 774 (Carnes, J., concurring). 
III 
 In addition to his challenge to the application of the 
threat of death enhancement, Zabielski challenges the 
substantive reasonableness of his sentence.  Because none of 
his arguments comes close to satisfying our very deferential 
standard of review, see Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568, we discuss 
them only briefly. 
 As we noted already, the District Court thoroughly 
considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and provided 
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numerous reasons for sentencing Zabielski to 24 months in 
prison.  It considered, among other things, Zabielski‘s 
background and past criminal activity, the seriousness of his 
crime, and the fact that he was ―bold enough to commit this 
crime in his own backyard,‖ which demonstrated a lack of 
respect for his community.  App. 298–99.  The District Court 
also considered the need to deter Zabielski and others from 
future criminal conduct and the need to protect the public 
from further crimes that Zabielski might commit.  It then 
weighed those factors against the remorse Zabielski showed 
at the sentencing hearing, and determined that 24 months‘ 
imprisonment was appropriate. 
 Despite the Court‘s detailed discussion of the 
§ 3553(a) factors, Zabielski argues that his sentence is too 
harsh because the District Court: (1) relied on unsubstantiated 
assumptions about bipolar disorder; (2) relied on 
unsubstantiated assumptions about his criminal background; 
and (3) sentenced him to imprisonment or increased the 
length of his sentence to facilitate rehabilitation.  Zabielski 
has not shown that the District Court‘s speculation about the 
effects his substance abuse had on his bipolar disorder 
affected his sentence.  And Zabielski‘s other two claims—that 
the District Court erred in relying on his bare arrest record 
and that it erred in sentencing him for a longer period to 
provide treatment or rehabilitation—lack any support in the 
record. 
1 
 
 Zabielski argues that the District Court sentenced him 
based, in part, on unsupported assumptions about bipolar 
disorder, rendering his sentence unreasonable.  He suggests 
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that his sentence would have been lower had the District 
Court not relied on the unsupported belief that his substance 
abuse and his unemployment were volitional, and that he was, 
to some degree, responsible for his own mental condition. 
 To the extent that the District Court considered 
Zabielski‘s history of substance abuse and unemployment in 
determining his sentence, it relied on assumptions supported 
by the record.  Zabielski does not dispute that he used illicit 
drugs and, at the time of sentencing, he continued to drink 
alcohol and was unemployed. 
 
 The District Court did speculate that Zabielski may 
have exacerbated his mental illness by abusing drugs and 
alcohol.  Zabielski claims that this speculation had no basis in 
any of the evidence presented, and argues that appellate 
courts have reversed judgments of sentence when they are 
based on unsupported assumptions about social science.  See 
United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 553 (3d Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 188 (2d Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 
The cases upon which Zabielski relies are inapposite.  
In each of those cases, the unsupported assumptions played a 
significant role in the sentencing determination.  Moreover, 
those cases involved child pornography and sexual conduct 
with minors, and the sentencing judges‘ beliefs about 
recidivism, though not supported by evidence in the record, 
were central to the judges‘ reasoning.  See Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 
at 547–50; Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 177–78; Miller, 601 F.3d at 
739–40; Bradley, 628 F.3d at 399–401.  Even then, the 
assumptions about recidivism did not, by themselves, render 
the defendants‘ sentences unreasonable.  Instead, the courts 
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considered broadly whether the sentence imposed was 
reasonable, and the unsupported assumption played one part 
in that larger inquiry.  See, e.g., Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184–86. 
 Here, by contrast, the District Court made several stray 
comments in the course of a detailed sentencing hearing, and 
Zabielski now attempts to imbue those statements with more 
significance than is warranted.  Viewing the sentencing 
hearing as a whole and the resulting sentence, the District 
Court‘s comments about the causes of Zabielski‘s mental 
disorder do not render the sentence substantively 
unreasonable. 
2 
 
 Zabielski also argues that the District Court improperly 
relied on his arrest record in determining his sentence.  He 
correctly notes that ―a bare arrest record—without more—
does not justify an assumption that a defendant has committed 
other crimes.‖  United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 284 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Nevertheless, a sentencing court may consider 
―[p]rior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a 
criminal conviction,‖ USSG § 4A1.3(a)(2)(E), as long as that 
conduct has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  
See Berry, 553 F.3d at 281.  Here, the District Court relied on 
more than Zabielski‘s ―bare arrest record‖ in assessing his 
background—it relied on testimony from an investigating 
officer who described Zabielski‘s past criminal conduct.  The 
District Court was entitled to consider that information at 
sentencing, even though the conduct did not result in a 
conviction. 
3 
Finally, Zabielski argues that the District Court might 
have imposed a longer term of incarceration to ensure that he 
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received the treatment he needed for his bipolar disorder.  
Under the Sentencing Reform Act, courts cannot impose or 
lengthen a prison term merely to promote an offender‘s 
rehabilitation.  Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 
(2011); United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 
2007).  This assuredly does not mean, however, that judges 
are prohibited from mentioning rehabilitation during the 
sentencing hearing.  Courts may still, for example, ―discuss[] 
the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the 
benefits of specific treatment or training programs.‖  Tapia, 
131 S. Ct. at 2392. 
The few statements of which Zabielski complains are 
taken out of context.  During the sentencing hearing, the 
District Court noted: 
I‘ve looked at the fact that you have an 
extensive mental health history.  And one 
reason why I think that incarceration at this 
point in time is necessary is the fact that you 
don‘t seem to be able to live up to the 
conditions that you need to maintain in order to 
keep yourself sober and on your medications. 
App. 306.  This statement does not indicate that the District 
Court sentenced Zabielski to ensure that he received 
treatment.  Zabielski argued throughout his sentencing 
hearing that his mental illness justified a lower sentence or 
probation.  He claimed that he had begun to manage his 
illness better since the robbery and was less likely to commit 
additional crimes.  The District Court, after considering 
Zabielski‘s past conduct, did not believe he was effectively 
managing his illness.  This statement reflects an exchange 
between the defendant and the sentencing judge; it does not 
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show that the District Court imposed a longer sentence to 
ensure that Zabielski received the treatment that he needed.  
Cf. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385, 2393 (remand was appropriate 
when the district court explained that ―one of the factors that 
affects [the length of the sentence] is the need to provide 
treatment.  In other words, so she is in long enough to get the 
500 Hour Drug Program, number one‖); Manzella, 475 F.3d 
at 155, 162 (remand was appropriate when the district court 
listed, among other reasons for the sentence, the need to 
―provide the Defendant with needed and effective educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other corrective 
treatment‖). 
 The District Court also stated: 
[T]he BOP, in my estimation, can treat your 
bipolar disorder.  They can treat your diabetes.  
They do have the medications available to 
you. . . . You have a history of depression, 
anxiety, and panic disorders as well.  I think 
those can be addressed at the BOP.  And in my 
estimation, the BOP generally goes beyond 
community standards for mental health.  So, I 
think whatever you‘re going to get in a facility 
is better than you could get in West Newton, 
especially if you‘re not working full time, and if 
you don‘t have [an insurance] card, and you 
don‘t have the money, because you‘re not 
working to pay for the medications. 
App. 309–10.  This statement is a response to the arguments 
raised by Zabielski in the course of his sentencing hearing.  
Zabielski argued that because of limited BOP resources, he 
may not be able to receive the treatment that he needs in 
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prison.  The District Court disagreed, finding that BOP 
facilities were capable of accommodating his needs.  This 
type of reference to rehabilitation is, under Tapia, both 
permitted and encouraged.  See 131 S. Ct. at 2392. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we hold that the application of 
the threat of death enhancement was harmless error, and 
Zabielski‘s sentence was not substantively unreasonable.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment of 
sentence. 
